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ABSTRACT 
Gender Pay Gap in Poland 
by Michal Grajek * 
The gender pay gap under central planning and its changes in the course of transition 
have only lately attracted the attention of researchers. Only few papers focused on 
comparison between two economic regimes, pre and post reform, having reported 
narrowing gap for all East European countries. This paper adds more detailed study of 
timing of the gap changes to existing evidence. This in turn allows to identify which 
mechanisms of transition were responsible for these changes. It investigates the earnings 
gap between females and males in Poland over the years 1987-1996, i.e. in the last years 
of central planning and during the period of transition to market economy. The JMP 
decomposition, which accounts for changes in overall wage dispersion over time beyond 
Oaxacas standard decomposition, is applied on large set of HBS data and reveals some 
interesting results. The year of giving away the power by the communists (1989) turned 
out to be far more important in terms of improving relative position of women than the 
actual year of launching the reform package (1990) and all the following years of 
transition. Females had gained substantially due to the structural shift in the very first 
years of the new economic system and the improvements have slowed down or even 
reversed in the next years, probably due to the statistical discrimination. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Geschlechterspezifische Einkommensunterschiede in Polen 
Die Entwicklung geschlechterspezifischer Einkommensunterschiede während des 
Übergangs von der zentralistischen Planwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft wird erst seit 
kurzem in der Forschung thematisiert. Die wenigen Arbeiten, die 
Einkommensdifferenzen zwischen den beiden Wirtschaftsystemen  vor und nach der 
Reform  untersuchen, weisen auf einen abnehmenden Abstand in allen mittel- und 
osteuropäischen Ländern hin. Der vorliegende Beitrag ergänzt die Forschung nicht nur 
um eine detaillierte Analyse des Anpassungsverlaufs der Einkommenslücke, sondern 
identifiziert auch die Ursachen dieser Entwicklung. Die Untersuchung, die anhand von 
haushaltsbezogenen Einkommensunterschieden zwischen Frauen und Männern in Polen 
erfolgt, berücksichtigt die letzten Jahre der zentralen Planwirtschaft und die 
Übergangszeit (1987-1996). Die Juhn-Murphy-Pierce-Zerlegung (JMP-Zerlegung), die 
im Gegensatz zur Oaxaca-Methode explizit Änderungen in der allgemeinen 
Einkommensverteilung berücksichtigt, wurde auf die umfangreichen Haushaltsdaten 
angewendet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß es 1989, dem Jahr der Beendigung der 
kommunistischen Führung, zu einer wesentlich stärkeren Verbesserung der relativen 
Einkommensposition der Frauen kam, als im folgenden Jahr, in welchem die 
Wirtschaftsreformen tatsächlich verabschiedet wurden. Insgesamt profitierten Frauen 
erheblich vom Strukturwandel der ersten Jahre nach der politischen Wende. Dieser 
Aufholprozeß verlangsamte sich später, wahrscheinlich durch einen statistischen 
Diskriminierungseffekt. 
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Introduction 
Interest in the issue of earnings gap and gender discrimination on labor markets has 
undeniably increased during the last decades. Politicians started treating the problem of 
discrimination as an important element in election campaigns; economists and sociologists 
created a new branch of scientific theories and have undertaken many attempts to investigate 
the problem empirically. The forerunner of the researches dealing with the problem of 
discrimination were naturally the United States, which on the one hand are deeply diversified 
from the ethnic point of view, and on the other are a democratic country, in which groups 
unsatisfied with their status have the possibility to exert political pressure on authorities. 
There the problem of discrimination was strengthened, as it comprised not only women but 
also colored people. In view of the importance of discrimination, it may seem surprising that 
economists have neglected its study. This statement from Becker (1957) has already become 
obsolete for the most developed countries of the world. However, it still seems to hold for 
Poland1.  Scientists and market researchers concentrate rather on different issues, most of all 
unemployment. It does not mean however, that this problem is absent on the Polish labor 
market. The fact that the issue of male-female wages differentials in Poland has not yet been 
openly brought up and, as a result, has neither become a subject of researches nor a goal of 
economic policy, means only a delay in an unavoidable process, which the Polish society will 
also be subjected to. 
Another motivation for inquiring polish male-females earnings data might be a hope 
for deeper understanding of the phenomenon of discrimination. In the centrally planned 
economy wages were assigned according to occupational wage scale within each industry. 
The enterprises operating under no competitive pressure were left with little impact on wage 
rates and wage differentials. The liberalization of the wage setting system, prices and trade 
during the transition toward market economy has changed this picture dramatically. The 
enterprises have gained some control over wages on the one hand, and have faced rising 
competition on the other. These peculiar changes in labor market institutions and competitive 
environment challenge the existing theory of discrimination. One might expect gradual 
driving out of discrimination according to Beckers (1957) classical model and the 
overcrowding model of Bergmann (1974). On the other hand, discrimination should survive 
or even strengthen according to the statistical discrimination models (e.g. Aigner and Cain, 
1977).  
                                                 
1 Exceptions are  Kot, Podolec and Ulman (1999), Brainerd (2000) and Grajek (2000) 
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This paper aims to refine the previous findings concerning the gender pay gap, using 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) data collected by the Polish Central Statistical Office over 
the years 1987 to 1996. This large dataset allows one to study in detail the trend of gender 
earnings differentials shaped under centrally planed regime and during the economic 
transition. With the help of decomposition analysis of the male-female pay gap the main 
forces driving the gap are revealed. The paper adds also to the influential study of Brainerd  
(2000) an analysis of further transition years (1995,1996), showing that after an initial 
narrowing, a rising gender gap may be experienced by transition countries other than these of 
the former Soviet Union. The issue of gender discrimination will be placed in the discussion 
as becoming more and more important in the course of the transition. 
The data used will be described in the following section of the paper (Chapter 2). 
Next, labor market institutional background under socialism (Chapter 3) and reforms toward 
market economy (Chapter 4) will be discussed shortly. Chapter 5 will present the 
decomposition technique used in the paper and Chapter 6 - the empirical results and a 
discussion of them. The final chapter will conclude. 
Data 
The analysis of this paper relies on the data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 
conducted by a rotational method by the Central Statistical Office (Glowny Urzad 
Statystyczny, GUS) over the years 1987-1990, 1992, 1995 and 1996. The data come from 
three rounds of the rotational panel, the first round being 1987-1990, the second 1991-1994 
and the third 1995-1998. The sample coverage is representative and quite large; it amounts for 
about 35 thousand households, which corresponds to about 100 thousand individuals each 
year. Within a given round, 2/3 of the sample size rotates each year, which gives about 3500 
individuals (1/27 of the coverage each year) who are present in the sample over all four years 
of a given round. The full data set from the 1987-1990 round, 1/3 of the 1992 data set (from 
the 1991-1994 round) and again a full set over the years 1995 and 1996 (from the 1995-1998 
round) are available for the analysis. 
For the purpose of the paper the sub-sample of the wage employed is utilized. The size 
of the sub-sample and means of demographic variables important for the analysis are given in 
Table 1. The survey (HBS) uses the concept of net monthly earnings consistently over the 
analyzed period. In this way the potential problem with introducing the personal income tax 
system in 1992 is resolved. Since this year the wages were shifted up by the amount of tax 
that each employee was supposed to pay, the earnings data remain consistent. The advantage 
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of the data is also that it covers employees from firms of any size. In contrast, other GUS data 
such as the Earnings Distribution as of September and the Survey of Economic Activity of the 
Population (BAEL), which come from a sample survey of employers, omit employees of 
small firms (i.e. employing less than six workers). 
The HBS data however is not free from disadvantages, the most important being the 
reliability of the reported earnings in the 1990s. Under the centrally planned regime, in the 
1980s, earnings data reported by respondents were verified with that reported by employers. 
This was no longer the case in the 1990s, hence the opportunity to under-report ones 
earnings. It seems reasonable to assume that top earners have greater propensity to do so than 
Table 1. Sample size and means of demographic variables. 
    Sample   Education (%)   Means 
Groupa   Size %   University Secondary Vocational Primary   Years of 
Schoolingb 
Years of 
Potential 
Experiencec 
1987            
Men  14968 55,66  8,01 21,86 45,30 24,83  10,49 20,66 
Women  11925 44,34  10,15 42,71 22,66 24,49  11,06 19,15 
Total  26893 100,00  8,96 31,10 35,26 24,68  10,74 19,99 
1988            
Men  14397 54,79  7,65 21,50 46,94 23,90  10,48 21,21 
Women  11881 45,21  9,87 42,13 24,08 23,92  11,04 19,62 
Total  26278 100,00  8,66 30,83 36,60 23,91  10,73 20,49 
1989            
Men  13739 54,44  7,27 21,04 47,58 24,11  10,44 21,72 
Women  11496 45,56  9,89 42,27 24,58 23,26  11,06 20,15 
Total  25235 100,00  8,46 30,71 37,10 23,72  10,72 21,01 
1990            
Men  12738 54,18  7,80 24,32 48,00 19,88  10,67 21,46 
Women  10773 45,82  10,33 45,64 24,11 19,92  11,35 20,18 
Total  23511 100,00  8,96 34,09 37,05 19,90  10,98 20,88 
1992            
Men  3708d 52,57  10,41 26,32 47,68 15,59  10,96 21,34 
Women  3346d 47,43  13,45 48,63 22,21 15,72  11,70 20,40 
Total  7054d 100,00  11,85 36,90 35,60 15,65  11,31 20,89 
1995            
Men  13572 52,27  11,18 27,31 49,20 12,31  11,10 20,29 
Women  12391 47,73  13,77 49,07 25,06 12,11  11,80 19,89 
Total  25963 100,00  12,41 37,70 37,68 12,21  11,44 20,10 
1996            
Men  13385 51,85  11,45 28,52 48,47 11,56  11,17 20,25 
Women  12430 48,15  14,84 48,66 25,01 11,50  11,88 19,75 
Total   25815 100,00   13,08 38,22 37,18 11,53   11,51 20,01 
aUp to 1992 the sample consists of public sector employees only, later private sector employees are also present. 
bCalculated on the basis of the highest completed education level. 
cCalculated as age minus potential years of schooling minus 6. 
dThe coverage in the year 1992 constitutes ca. 1/3 of the usual one. 
Source: selected sample of wage employed from HBS data, GUS; author's calculations. 
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the middle ones. Since there are more men than women in this group, the male-female wage 
gap after the 1989 is likely to be underestimated. 
Another problem in HBS is the coverage of the private sector of the economy. The 
employees in that sector are omitted in the sample over the period 1987-1992. This might be 
observed through the size of the sample reported in Table 1. The size of the private sector was 
negligible in 1987 (3,6% of employment, as reported in Rutkowski, 1996), but had increased 
gradually, pushing the size of the sample constituted by public sector employees down. In the 
years 1995 and 1996 the sample returned to its original size, because the private sector 
workers had been incorporated. This gap in coverage does not pose a serious problem for the 
analysis however. Comparing earnings functions estimates based on HBS (without private 
sector) and Labor Force Survey data (with private sector) Rutkowski (1996) reports: both 
surveys give similar parameter estimates for the overlap year (1992). Also in Grajek (2000), 
decomposition of the gender pay gap with and without private sector over the years 1995 and 
1996 reveals only slight increase of explained difference (by ca. 2,5 log % points) in favor of 
women when private sector is present and no change in unexplained difference. 
Institutional Background and Position of Female Labor under Socialism 
Labor market institutions in socialist Poland mirrored these of other east block 
countries and to an extent might be considered together as a Soviet block model. A fine 
description of the institutions in context of male-female differentials may be found in 
Brainerd (2000) and Ogloblin (1999). Neither of these however, pays special attention to the 
peculiarities of the Polish example. 
The most important feature of the wage setting policy in countries of the Soviet block 
was that it regulated basic wages by means of (characteristic for each industry) wage rate 
scales (for more details see Adam, 1984). The spread between the lowest wage rate (set for  
the lowest grade) and the highest one in given industry was supposed to reflect the difference 
in skills required for performing jobs of different complexity. Moreover, the difference 
between wage rates scales reflected different importance attached to different industries by 
planners. According to principles of Marxist political economy, the production of means of 
productions (heavy industry) was superior to the production of consumer goods (light 
industry), which in turn was superior to the so-called non-productive sphere (education, 
healthcare, trade etc.). Additionally, the wage rate scales reflected the ideological importance 
of the working class, i.e. blue-collar workers as opposed to white-collar workers. This wage 
setting policy lead to lower wages inequality in countries of the Soviet bloc than in these of 
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Western Europe and the United States, as illustrated in Table 2. Take 1987 as a good 
reference year for Poland2; the wages at the 90th percentile of the male distribution are about 
92 log % points higher than the wages at the 10th percentile. The corresponding figures in the 
year 1990 are 116 log % points for the UK and 140% for the United States. 
Table 2. Measures of the Log Wages Distribution (log % points) in Poland, UK 
and USA. 
Men  Women 
Year 90-10a 90-50 50-10   90-10 90-50 50-10 
Polandb            
1987 91,93 49,23 42,71  85,36 40,40 44,97 
1988 88,64 46,77 41,87  85,46 39,00 46,46 
1989 93,82 46,17 47,64  86,70 41,35 45,35 
1990 94,56 50,34 44,22  91,65 47,35 44,30 
1992 106,55 58,39 48,17  94,91 49,45 45,46 
1995 116,82 62,98 53,84  101,24 57,95 43,29 
1996 119,26 65,13 54,13   103,61 57,74 45,87 
UKc               
1990  116 67 49   111 64 47 
USAc              
1990  140 69 71  127 67 61 
aThe log wage at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution minus the log wage at the 10th percentile of the distribution; 
similarly 90-50 and 50-10. 
Source: selected sample of wage employed from HBS data, GUS; author's calculations. 
cSource: Katz et al. (1995) cited by Brainerd (2000). 
Trade unions in the centrally planned economies played a different role than those in 
market economies. Their primary task was basically to gain support for the governments 
wage policy and more generally to mobilize workers to fulfill economic goals set by the 
central planners. In the Polish context however, this was true only for the official trade unions 
(OPZZ) controlled by the communist party (PZPR) and not for independent unions associated 
within Solidarity. In fact, strong egalitarian pressure exerted by Solidarity in the early 1980s 
resulted in a sharp fall of earnings inequality. Workers unrest and egalitarian demands caused 
significant reduction in earnings differentials again in 1988 (see Table 2), even though 
Solidarity had been delegalized since December 1981. 
Another important feature of the Soviet-type economy was an excess demand for labor 
driven by economic plans targeting rapid industrialization and extensive growth of the 
economy. Enterprises faced no particular necessity for labor economizing since they did not 
                                                 
2 Rutkowski (1996) in the discussion of the wages dispersion in Poland considers the year 1987 as the last 
normal year preceding the incipient fall of the communist economy, a year representing the situation 
prevailing in the middle 1980s. 
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benefit from labor savings; instead they had to focus on plan fulfillment. These regulations do 
not surprise when you take into account the commitment to full employment from the very 
beginning of central planning (Adam, 1984). Unemployment was not recognized in official 
statistics and the official unemployment rates were first published in 1990 reaching 6.1% by 
the end of the year. Under socialism, the ideological principle of integration into the social 
sphere of production ruled. 
That principle considered also women. Female labor was needed to satisfy the excess 
demand for labor, as described above, and official policies encouraged women to enter the 
labor force in many ways. First of all, women were given the same educational opportunities 
as men, which resulted in higher average educational attainment of females compared to 
males. For example, in the academic year 1988/89, the proportion of women in the overall 
number of university students was 51,4%. This might also be observed in the sample 
considered in this paper. In Table 1, the average of female years of schooling is higher than 
male by ca. half a year consistently over the period 1987-1996. The advantage of females in 
the share of workers with a university degree rises from ca. 2 to 2,5-3 % points over that 
period. Secondly, generous maternity benefits and well-developed day care center provision 
have to be mentioned. The prolonged maternity leave program introduced in 1968 can serve 
as an example. Women had been entitled to take a four years maternity leave for each child 
(since 1981 with an allowance, Adam, 1984) Thirdly, perhaps most important, low average 
real earnings silently, but very efficiently, encouraged women to supply household income in 
order to maintain decent living standards. And finally, the principle of equal pay for equal 
work regardless of gender was guaranteed and emphasized, explicitly in the Labor Code and 
implicitly in the same wage rate scales for both males and females. 
These policies and attitudes resulted in Soviet block countries in extremely high by 
international standards participation rates of women in the labor force. 1980s saw in Poland 
female participation rate slightly above 70% compared with around 80% for males. It does not 
mean however, that women achieved labor market outcomes relatively equal to men. In spite 
of proclaimed gender equality women as labor force experienced specific treatment by the 
authorities, which resembled occupational segregation and promotional discrimination 
recognized in Western economies. The difference was that these attitudes were 
institutionalized through official policies under socialism. In the Polish Labor Code women 
were particularly protected because their physical constitution did not allow them to perform 
certain jobs (Romer, 1993). In this way women were encouraged to enter the non-
productive sphere and light industries and also inclined toward white-collar occupations. 
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Since these industries and occupations were recognized as inferior by Marxist ideology, they 
were remunerated accordingly. Promotional patterns were influenced in a similar, perhaps 
more subtle way, encouraging women not to pursue their professional careers too far.  
An obvious consequence of the above described policies and attitudes was the 
sustaining gender wage gap, in fact, similar in terms of female-male wage ratio to that 
observed in Western economies. The ratio in socialist Poland (Table 3, 1987, 1988) at the 
level of roughly 72% fits in the middle of the 1989 European and US figures (the range being 
from 68% in the UK to 75% in Italy, excluding the unusually low case of Benelux and the 
unusually high case of Scandinavian countries, as reported by Brainerd, 2000).  
Table 3. Female-Male Relative Performance. 
   Oaxaca Decomposition at the Mean 
Year 
Wage Ratio (%) 
at Means 
Position of Mean 
Female in Male Wage 
Distributiona 
Overall Difference   
(log % points) 
Unexplained 
Difference           
(log % points) 
1987 70,82 25,03 34,50 35,09 
1988 72,33 25,78 32,39 32,68 
1989 79,68 33,14 22,72 24,15 
1990 82,18 35,84 19,62 22,29 
1992 80,74 35,90 21,40 24,30 
1995 78,01 34,71 24,84 30,46 
1996 78,43 34,90 24,30 30,29 
aCalculated by assigning each woman a percentile in the male wage distribution and finding a mean of those rankings. 
Source: selected sample of wage employed from HBS data, GUS; author's calculations. 
The female-male wage ratio is however a misleading indicator of relative male-female 
labor market performance, because of its sensitivity to overall wages dispersion in the 
economy. If one squeezed overall wages distribution, as it was the case in centrally planed 
economies (Table 2), an average man would loose relatively to an average woman, because 
women tend to be in the lower tail of the distribution more often than men. The average 
female percentile in male wage distribution is less sensitive to this problem expressing the 
average position of women in male wage hierarchy. By this measure, women in 1987 Poland 
with an average position of ca. 25th percentile (Table 3) did significantly worse than in 1985-
86 US (32nd percentile) and all other developed countries reported in Blau and Kahn (2000). 
Overall, it appears that male-female occupational differences were greater in pre-
reform Poland (and other East European countries, as positions of mean female in male wage 
distributions in Brainerd, 2000 illustrate) than in Western industrialized countries, which was 
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offset by smaller wage inequalities in the former, yielding similar average female-male wage 
ratios. 
Market Reforms 
Major reforms, which the Polish economy went through on its way toward market 
economy, were implemented on 1 January 1990 in the form of an initial reform package, 
known also as Balcerowicz Plan. The reform package affected employment and wages in 
many ways, most important in rising pressure on enterprises from both the supply and the 
demand side, final abandoning of the direct control of enterprises by authorities and 
fundamental institutional restructuring (e.g. layoffs regulations, new wage setting system).  
The reform package included removing restrictions on foreign trade and setting up 
private firms. Price liberalization began already in 1989, when the last communist 
government freed food prices. The proportion of controlled prices was further decreased from 
50% to 10% (Berg, Blanchard, 1994). This led to increasing domestic and foreign competition 
creating demand side pressure on enterprises. On the supply side, budget subsidies to state 
enterprises were reduced from 6.2% of GDP in 1989 to 1.4% in 1992 (Rutkowski, 1994), 
which was meant to remove the soft budget constraint and induce economizing on costs. This 
policy had already been attempted in 1989, but 1990 was a clear breakthrough (Berg, 
Blanchard, 1994).  
Relaxing constraints on wage and employment decisions together with subsidies 
withdrawal aimed at final abandoning of the direct control of enterprises by the state. In fact, 
substantial economic freedom (self-financing, self-governing) was granted to them already in 
1982, but the government retained much of the control through informal channels 
(Rutkowski, 1994). The turn of nominal into actual freedom might explain the dramatic 
change in male wages inequality that occurred in 1989. As given in Table 2, top earners were 
remunerated ca. 94 log % points higher than bottom ones in 1989, which corresponds to ca. 
89 log % points a year before. This change was mostly driven by a rise of inequality at the 
lower tail of the distribution. Since the female-dominated non-productive sphere continued 
to be financed by the state budget according to wage rate scales, the change in women wages 
distribution was not that dramatic. 
Institutional restructuring included, among other things, a new regulation concerning 
lay-offs, which actually made it possible to dismiss workers for other than disciplinary 
reasons. Unemployment, a new experience for Poland, was first recognized in 1990. Attempts 
to establish new structures of collective bargaining were largely unsuccessful (Socha, 
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Sztanderska, 1991), therefore an excess wage tax (ranging from 100% to 500% depending on 
the level of overstepping the allowed limit) remained the primary tool for regulating wage 
growth until 1992. On the other hand rising minimum wage (from around 20% in 1990 and 
35% in 1991 to slightly above 40% from 1992 on, Brainerd, 2000) aimed to protect the 
poorest from growing wage inequality. 
The privatization program implemented in the Privatization Act was approved by the 
Parliament in February 1991. The aim of the program was to achieve within 5 years an 
ownership structure similar to that of Western Europe. Yet, despite the priority attached to 
privatization, its tempo had been slow from the very beginning (Wellisz et. al., 1991). 
According to the BHS data used in this paper, over 60% of the employees still worked in the 
public sector in 1996. 
Gender Pay Gap Decomposition 
A very convenient tool for studying the gender pay gap in context of this paper is the 
JMP decomposition developed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991). First of all, it looks at the 
change in pay differentials over time, what is crucial to the analysis here as opposed to 
detailed explanation of the gap by means of various productivity characteristics, work history 
and occupational variables. This rich array of variables is simply not available in HBS data 
studied here. Secondly, JMP decomposition catches the impact of overall wage inequality rise 
on the pay gap. Since the rise on overall wage inequality is an obvious consequence of the 
transition from the centrally planned to market economy, this must be taken into account in 
investigating the gender gap. The presentation of the JMP decomposition below follows 
roughly Blau and Kahn (1997). 
The starting point is the wage equation for male worker i in a period t written in the 
form: 
(1)  itttitit XW θσβ += , 
where Wit is the log of wages, Xit is a vector of productivity characteristics, and θit is the 
standardized residual (with mean 0 and variance 1) of the i-th male worker. Further, βt is a 
vector of coefficients and σt is the standard deviation of the residuals from the male wage 
regression. This way of writing the wage equation distinguishes the impact of ones position 
in residual distribution θit and of the spread (σt) of the distribution itself on ones wage. 
Now, the male-female wage gap can be written as: 
(2)  tFtMttFtMtFtMtt XXWWD σθθβ )()( −+−=−≡ , 
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where M and F subscripts refer to male and female averages and θFt = (WFt  XFtβt)/σt. This 
decomposition is actually equivalent to one of the two variants of the standard technique 
introduced by Oaxaca (1973). The first term on the RHS is the part of the wage differential 
explained by observed characteristics, while the second term constitutes unexplained 
(residual) difference, which can be attributed to unobserved characteristics and 
discrimination. Again, the spread (σt) of the males residual distribution arises explicitly in the 
notation. 
 The change in the gender gap between two periods t and t can be then decomposed 
into four parts: 
(3)  
[ ]
[ ] ).)(()()(
))(()()(
''''
'''''
ttFtMttFtMtFtMt
ttFtMttFtFtMtMttt XXXXXXDD
σσθθσθθθθ
βββ
−−+−−−+
+−−+−−−=−
 
The first term on the RHS is known in the literature as Observed Xs effect. It accounts for 
changes in relative male-female observed characteristics (labor market skills). Since it is 
unlikely, that over a short period there is a big difference in acquiring skills between male and 
female employees or that the new labor market entrants differ substantially in this respect, 
large Observed Xs effect would suggest asymmetric perturbations to labor market 
participation of males and females. 
 The second term, known as Observed Prices effect, reflects the change in 
remuneration of observed skills (represented by male skills returns) by the labor market. 
Increasing returns to skills are likely in the course of transition to market economy due to 
abandoning of the artificially squeezed central wage setting system. Since women tend to be 
better educated on average and the measure of work experience available in this study is only 
the potential experience (see Table 4 for variable definitions), the increase is likely to be 
beneficial for women. 
 The third, Gap effect, captures the change in unexplained gender wage difference 
corrected for the change in unexplained wages dispersion (represented by standard deviation 
of the male residuals distribution). The idea behind it is to catch the changing relative 
performance of women due to changes in relative unobserved skills (ability to command 
people, willingness to work overtime, to accept stress etc.) and discrimination rather than 
changes in the dispersion of that distribution.  
 The fourth term, Unobserved Prices effect, captures the part of the change in gender 
pay gap due to change of the dispersion of the male wage residual distribution. This term is 
meant to illustrate the effect of rising returns to unobserved skills (analogous to the observed 
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skills) during transition. If women acquire less unobserved skills on average or are 
discriminated (segregated) against, this rise will work against them. 
Discussion of the Empirical Results 
The decomposition technique described above was applied to the selected sample of 
the HBS data at the mean. The wage regressions, as in (1), were estimated by OLS separately 
for each year. The dependent variable was the logarithm of after-tax monthly earnings 
(including wages, bonuses and benefits). The earnings have not been corrected for the number 
of hours worked. This might bias upward the unexplained male-female wage gap, since 
women are more likely to work part-time. The bias does not seem severe however, because 
part-time work is rather uncommon in Poland. The definitions of explanatory variables and 
the results of the wage regressions are given in the Appendix, in Table A1 and Table A2 
respectively. With the help of the estimates of these regressions standard Oaxaca 
decomposition as in (2) was calculated and the last columns of Table 3 present the results. 
Table 4 presents the JMP decomposition3 carried out as in (3). 
Table 4. Decomposition of the Change in the Gender Wage Gap 
(log % points; base year = 1987). 
 Overall  Of Which:  Sum: 
Year 
Change in 
Gender 
Gap 
Observed 
X's       
(1) 
Observed 
Prices    
(2) 
Gap      
(3) 
Unobserved 
Prices     
(4)   
Gender 
Specific   
(1)+(3) 
Wage 
Structure  
(2)+(4) 
Explained 
(1)+(2) 
Un-
explained  
(3)+(4) 
1988 -2,1a 0,2 0,1 -1,9 -0,5  -1,7 -0,4 0,3 -2,4 
1989 -11,8 -0,5 -0,3 -14,1 3,2  -14,6 2,8 -0,8 -10,9 
1990 -14,9 -0,6 -1,5 -13,9 1,1  -14,6 -0,3 -2,1 -12,8 
1992 -13,1 -1,0 -1,3 -16,4 5,7  -17,5 4,4 -2,3 -10,8 
1995 -9,7 -1,8 -3,4 -12,1 7,5  -13,9 4,1 -5,1 -4,6 
1996 -10,2 -1,6 -3,8 -11,4 6,6   -13,0 2,8 -5,4 -4,8 
aNegative numbers indicate a decrease of the gap subject to the base year, i.e. improving relative wages of women. 
Source: selected sample of wage employed from HBS data, GUS; author's calculations. 
 
A first look at the relative female-male performance figures reveals 1989 as the most 
spectacular in change. All measures presented in Table 3 increase that year dramatically in 
favor of women. Overall difference (the gender gap) falls by almost 10 log % points (which 
correspond to the 12,4 log % points fall over the period 1986-1992 reported in Brainerd, 
2000), of which over 8 points correspond to unexplained difference fall. Position of mean 
female in male wage distribution also went up by 7,5 percentiles. In context of this measure 
                                                 
3 Altogether four variants of the decomposition might be calculated using different weights; the variant used in 
the paper was chosen for consistency with Brainerd (2000). 
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80% of the change over the nine years period studied here occurred just in 1989. This is why 
this year calls for special attention. 
 It is important to note, that actual market reforms had begun one year after, but 1989 
was the year of the first democratic parliamentary elections, which resulted in forming the 
first non-communist government. The relative women wage improvement might be explained 
by the earnings dispersion measures (Table 2). As mentioned before, men at the lower tail of 
the wages distribution suffered substantial loss compared to women. The likely reason for that 
was freeing of state owned enterprises (SOEs) managers from informal government control. 
Hyperinflation reaching 251,1% in 1989, an experience without precedence in post-war 
Poland, and associated wages indexation problems may have also harmed SOEs employees 
more, because of unclear wage setting procedures. Altogether, the first wave of changes 
influenced males and females in different proportions. Males, constituting the majority of 
employment in SOEs, were more exposed to labor economizing and had lost relative to 
females over-represented in the budgetary sphere.  
 Further improvements (after 1898) of women position in mens wage distribution were 
far less spectacular. 1990 saw the next upward movement by ca. 2,5 percentiles and since then 
the measure had stabilized around 35th percentile. On the other hand, female-male wage ratio 
decreased by a 4 % points over 1990-1996. The discrepancy between these two measures 
comes from the fact, that the latter is more sensitive to overall wage inequality as indicated 
before.  
 Let us now turn to the JMP decomposition of the gender wage gap (Table 6) and see 
what we can learn from it. The decomposition over 1987-1992 corresponds quite well to that 
reported in Brainerd (2000) over 1986-1992. Again it is clear that 1989 is a breakthrough. The 
14,1 log % points improvement of relative women position is basically due to the Gap 
effect, which means radical change in unexplained factors, actually working against rising 
wages inequality. The relative loss of males in the first wave of changes described above is 
responsible for that to a great extent. Rise in observed prices encounters only for slight (0,3 
log % points) improvement of womens position over the 1987-1989 period, and so does the 
observed skills improvement, the latter being an evidence for no significant asymmetric 
perturbations in male-female relative labor market participation (Hunt, 1997, attributed 
approx. 40%. of the narrowing of the gap in Eastern Germany to less skilled women exiting 
the labor force). Also Brainerd (2000) reports no significant changes of net supply of male 
and female workers over 1986-1992 in Poland. Altogether, unexplained factors are to a great 
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extent responsible for the first wave of relative improvement for women (10,9 log % points 
vs. 0,8 log % point due to explained factors). 
 This picture changes gradually and although the overall change remains similar 
for 1987-1996 period (10,2 log % points improvement), explained and unexplained factors 
have now almost equal shares in it. The magnitude of the Observed Xs effect is relatively 
small and rises slowly over the whole period. Since statistical evidences do not support the 
idea of the less skilled women dropping out of the labor market in Poland, it is likely that new 
cohorts take advantage of better education and thanks to improvements in relative observed 
skills equipment shorten the distance to men. The effect doubles since the private sector had 
been incorporated to the sample (1995 and 1996), which is in line with the presented 
reasoning, because the private sector attracts well-educated members of the new cohorts 
more. 
Rising returns to education benefit women and help them to catch up with men as the 
Observed Prices effect shows. Again, incorporation of the private sector is noticeable in this 
effect. These two gradually rising effects result in gaining importance of explained factors in 
the gender pay gap change. 
 Interestingly, the Gap effect that drives the improving relative performance of 
women till 1992 turns against them later on. It would be rather difficult to find the reason for 
the fall in relative females unobserved skills. One explanation might be that after the initial 
abandoning of distortions resulting from the principles of Marxist political economy (what 
relatively benefited women as working outside heavy industry more often), another market 
force had taken the leading position, namely statistical discrimination. Since it is likely, that 
women on average have less unobserved skills, it may pay off to discourage them to 
promotions in favor of men and pay them lower wages accordingly. 
 Rising prices for unobserved skills (an element of overall rise of earnings 
inequality) had further harmed women as the Unobserved Prices effect shows. In sum, due 
to unexplained factors the gender gap increased by 6,1 log % points over the years 1989-1996, 
but the initial (1987-1989) fall of 10,9 log % points had not been offset. 
14 
Conclusions 
A detailed examination of the gender pay gap in Poland over 1987-1996 revealed 
some interesting results. First of all, the year of giving away the power by the communists 
(1989) turned out to be far more important in context of male-female earnings differentials 
than the actual year of launching the reforms package (1990). The gain of substantial real 
economic freedom (self-financing, self-governing) by SOEs managers might explain that 
phenomenon inducing the relative erosion in male wages at the lower tale of the distribution. 
Altogether, the first wave of changes affected males and females in a different degree. 
Abandoning of distortions resulting from the principles of Marxist political economy 
relatively benefited women as working outside heavy industry more often. These changes are 
best illustrated by position of mean female in male wage distribution, which from the level of 
25th percentile in 1987 jumped to around 33rd in 1989 and increased further to almost 36th 
percentile in 1992. Since then the position of mean female in male wage distribution had 
stabilized and even reported slight decrease (by 1 percentile). It turns out to be driven by two 
offsetting effects. On the one hand, rising relative observed skills equipment and returns to 
them had pushed women up the male wages distribution. On the other , possible strengthening 
of discrimination practices, as statistical discrimination models would predict, had balanced 
the former effect. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable Definitions. 
Education Dummies 
Univ University/college  
Sec Secondary/high school 
Voc Ordinary vocational school 
Omitted category Primary/elementary school (also incomplete) 
Experience Variables 
Exp Potential experience calculated as age - years of schooling - 6 
Exp2 Square of Exp/100 
Ownership Dummya 
Priv Employed in private sector 
Omitted category Employed in public sector 
Regional Dummies 
Largeb Lives in town larger than 500 000 inhabitants 
Mediumb Lives in town larger than 100 000 but smaller than 500 000 inhabitants 
Small Lives in town larger than 20 000 but smaller than 100 000 inhabitants 
Omitted category Lives in town smaller than 20 000 inhabitants or in the countryside 
aOnly in 1995 and 1996; before only public sector employees are there in the sample. 
bBefore 1995 Large and Medium categories are indistinguishable; appropriate variable is the sum of the two. 
 
 
Table A2. Male Log Earnings Regression Results (t-statistics in parentheses). 
  Year 
Variable 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1995 1996 
Univ 0,276a 0,289 0,315 0,428 0,433 0,599 0,635 
 (21,9) (22,5) (21,3) (29,7) (15,2) (37,7) (40,3) 
Sec 0,145 0,150 0,130 0,169 0,168 0,246 0,266 
 (15,9) (16,3) (12,4) (16,3) (7,4) (18,7) (20,3) 
Voc 0,121 0,127 0,079 0,091 0,103 0,118 0,119 
 (15,5) (16,0) (8,9) (9,9) (5,0) (9,8) (9,8) 
Exp 0,035 0,032 0,032 0,025 0,018 0,036 0,033 
 (33,7) (30,0) (27,2) (20,8) (6,8) (25,8) (24,4) 
Exp2 -0,061 -0,053 -0,054 -0,038 -0,021 -0,068 -0,061 
 (-27,5) (-24,1) (-22,2) (-15,2) (-3,6) (-21,0) (-19,0) 
Priv - - - - - -0,068 -0,060 
 - - - - - (-8,8) (-8,0) 
Large 0,151 0,190 
 (12,3) (16,6) 
Medium 
0,162b 0,141 0,099 0,136 0,162 
0,205 0,182 
 (22,4) (19,4) (12,1) (17,0) (10,0) (21,0) (19,4) 
Small 0,124 0,102 0,088 0,109 0,104 0,130 0,119 
 (15,0) (12,3) (9,1) (12,2) (6,1) (13,6) (12,3) 
Constant 9,775 10,383 11,723 13,330 14,305 5,558 5,809 
 (762,3) (784,3) (787,4) (883,4) (426,0) (312,4) (330,4) 
Adj. R2 0,163 0,147 0,115 0,158 0,138 0,228 0,242 
Sample N 14968 14397 13739 12738 3708 13572 13385 
aAll variables estimates are significant at 1% level. 
bFor the years 1987-1992 the categories Medium and Large are indistinguishable. 
Source: selected sample of wage employed from HBS data, GUS; author's calculations. 
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